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THE LIABILITY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
UNDER UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
The domestic economy of the United States faces a growing
problem. Competition is being threatened by the increased
presence of powerful foreign government enterprises in the
domestic market. Currently, fifty-nine of the 500 largest commer-
cial enterprises in the world are government-owned and controlled,
and the number is growing. From 1957 to 1976, the number of such
firms increased twelvefold. Their rate of growth has surpassed
that of privately-owned non-American based firms headquartered
outside the United States.' Because it is large and unrestricted, the
United States market has been an attractive target for foreign
government enterprises. These firms have an advantage over
domestic competitors because they possess almost unlimited
resources, and because of their relative immunity from United
States antitrust laws. The free market system alone may not pro-
vide adequate protection against these great concentrations of
economic power. As Leonard Silk has indicated, economic exploita-
tion through state cartels, monopolization of supply channels, state
bargaining, and central planning may doom the market itself.2
The keystone to the United States market system is the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. Embodying fundamental economic policy, the
Sherman Act prohibits conduct that monopolizes or restrains
"'commerce . . . with foreign nations," as well as conduct that
hampers domestic competition.' Few other nations, however, em-
brace the jurisprudence of the Sherman Act, especially within the
context of transnational trade. Therefore, a longstanding debate
concerning the extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States an-
titrust laws has surrounded those controversies in which enter-
prises operating primarily overseas, but whose commercial activ-
ity affects consumers or competitors within the United States, are
charged in United States courts with Sherman Act violations.4
Sales by state enterprises account for 21% of the sales of these 500 largest firms. D.
LAMONT, FOREIGN STATE ENTERPRISES 4 (1979).
2 Market v. State, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1975, at 47, col. 2.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
4 See generally B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET, AND INTERNATIONAL AN-
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During the past fifty years, United States courts consistently
have construed the language of the Sherman Act to hold that anti-
competitive activities or decisions occurring primarily within a
foreign jurisdiction, but which substantially affect the trade and
economy of the United States, are subject to Sherman Act
jurisdiction in federal courts, regardless of the legitimacy of those
activities as measured by the law of the situs.5
Notwithstanding the expansive view of the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act taken by United States courts,
several legal barriers have prevented effective use of antitrust
laws to protect the United States market from the anti-
competitive practices of foreign governments or government-
owned enterprises. The three main obstacles have been the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and the
limited coverage of the substance of the Sherman Act.' In the last
few years, however, absolute sovereign immunity has been replac-
ed by the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity as codified in
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act;7 judicially created excep-
tions have similarly eroded the breadth of the act of state doc-
TITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1979); J. TOWNSEND. EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST (1980);
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF THE U.S. ANTITRUST
LAWS, S. REP. NO. 770, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Speech by Donald Flexner, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, denying charges of United States antitrust imperalism
(December 6, 1979), TRADE REG. REP. No. 416 (CCH); Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 199
(1977).
' See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979).
See also Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1247, 1249-50 (1977). Generally speaking, when allegedly illegal conduct is performed
by a non-United States citizen on foreign soil, United States courts have held that
American jurisdiction applies to that conduct if supported by either the "protective
theory" -applicable when challenged conduct threatens or interferes with United States
governmental operations or security-or the "objective territorial" theory -applicable
when the challenged conduct was intended to have an effect within the United States. See
United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Comment, Ex-
traterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE
L.J. 259, 260-64 (1960). Additional bases for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
have been recognized in international law. See Dickinson, Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime, Introductory Comment, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935); and Ongman, Con-
structing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope,
71 N.W.U.L. REV. 733, 737 (1977).
' The Sherman Act's prohibitions apply only to "persons," including corporations, but do
not expressly apply to foreign governments. Thus, there is substantial ambiguity as to
whether the Act would be interpreted to apply to a corporation or enterprise wholly-owned
and operated by a foreign government or to the foreign government itself.
' 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976).
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trine;8 and finally, the Supreme Court decisions in Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India9 and City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co.'" have broadened significantly the definition of "person"
under the Sherman Act and thereby potentially broadened its
coverage. Each of these developments has moved the law closer to
a recognition of antitrust liability for the commercial activities of
foreign governments.
Although the trend is to break down these legal barriers, they
still pose formidable obstacles to antitrust actions against foreign
governments." There is a deep-rooted inertia stubbornly working
in opposition to the trend. Courts are uncomfortable with the
thought of sitting in judgment of foreign governments. The fact
that foreign relations is a realm into which the courts have been
reluctant to venture" is understandable in view of the sensitive
nature of the subject and the judiciary's lack of special expertise.
Consequently, although Congress and the Supreme Court appear
to have dismantled certain barriers of general application, it is
uncertain whether such dismantling will be recognized, in light of
international comity and separation of powers concerns, in the
radical context of antitrust litigation against foreign governments.'3
The leading case in this trend is Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
But see Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
'0 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
" In International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), the
only antitrust case brought against a foreign government, the court based its dismissal of
the action upon, among other grounds, sovereign immunity and the supposedly limited
coverage of the Sherman Act. Although requested to do so by the court, the Justice
Department declined to submit an amicus brief expressing its views on the law. As of this
writing, the decision is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
" See the interesting discussion of the issue in Medvedieff v. Cities Service Oil Co., 35 F.
Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See also Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the In-
ternational Legal Order, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 24 (1970).
S Of course, non-sovereign enterprises also may employ the act of state defense. See
Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959). See also Industrial Inv.
Dev. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980). Also
available is the "foreign compulsion" defense, which generally is thought to immunize a
private corporation from antitrust liability when its challenged conduct was coerced by a
foreign government. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291 (D.C. Del. 1971). See also speech by Davidow, "U.S. Antitrust and Doing
Business Abroad: Recent Trends and Developments," (Sept. 28, 1979); and Comment,
Foreign Government Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Laws, 7 VA. J.
OF INTL. L. 100 (1966). Although this Note does not consider the less controversial issue of
the liability of non-sovereign foreign corporations, the recurring appearance of the foreign
compulsion defense suggests the increasing need, in equity and law, to determine whether
foreign governments responsible for anticompetitive behavior affecting American citizens
within the United States may be sued directly in United States courts.
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II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
At the time of the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, absolute
sovereign immunity was the general rule. Adopted by the
Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,'4 the
rule precluded a court from taking jurisdiction over a government
without regard to the type of activities in which it was engaged.
The original rationale behind the rule was respect for the dignity
of a sovereign. Initially, sovereign immunity caused few problems
because of the relatively small scope of government activities.
However, the concept began to create difficulties as governments
ventured outside traditional roles. A gradual shift toward the
domestic restriction of sovereign immunity can be traced to 1824
when, in Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, John Mar-
shall wrote "that when a government becomes a partner in any
trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transac-
tions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of
a private citizen."'5
With respect to foreign governments, restrictive immunity was
slow to gain acceptance in the United States, although it had
become the norm in international practice. With the exception of
Great Britain and the Communist bloc, most countries early on
made the transition to restrictive immunity in recognition of in-
creasing commercial activities of governments. Meanwhile, the
United States government was subjected to considerable liability
in the courts of other countries."6
As international recognition of absolute sovereign immunity
diminished, United States courts sought a new rationale for conti-
nuing to apply the doctrine. The new justification was found in the
old principle of separation of powers. In Ex Parte Republic of
Peru, the Supreme Court reasoned that sovereign immunity af-
fected the conduct of foreign relations, which was the responsibili-
ty of the executive branch of government." Thus, it was not until
" 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The rule, however, was not required by the Constitution
or statute: "Judicial power shall extend ... to controversies ... between a state , or citizens
thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. §
1332(aX2) (1976).
15 22 U.S. 904, 906 (1824).
, See Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defense: Transnational Boycotts
and Economic Coercion, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976). See also L. HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE (2d ed. 1976).
" 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943). See also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), in
which the Court held that it was obliged to give dispositive effect to the State
Department's refusal to recommend immunity.
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1952, after the Department of State released the so-called "Tate
Letter," that the courts began applying the new doctrine on a
case-by-case basis." Subsequently, the courts depended increas-
ingly upon the State Department to recommend when restrictive
immunity should be applied.
A danger of this dependency was the potential for inconsistent
applications of the doctrine in cases where political considerations
pressured the State Department to recommend immunity without
regard to the nature of the governmental activities involved. One
of the motives behind the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976 (FSIA) was a desire to free the judiciary
from its dependence on the State Department. As revealed in its
legislative history
[a] principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination
of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial
branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of im-
munity determinations and assuring litigants these often crucial
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under pro-
cedures that insure due process. "
Under the restrictive doctrine, the legal determination of
whether a government should be entitled to immunity turns on
whether the particular activity is a public act (jure imperii) or a
private act (jure gestionio). The latter is not entitled to immunity.
It is difficult to draw the line separating public from private acts.
Several methods were discussed in Victory Transport, Inc. v.
," Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to Phillip
B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 983
(1952). The State Department gave three reasons for this shift in policy:
(1) the increased international acceptance of the restrictive principle, and the feel-
ing that if the United States was allowing itself to be sued in other countries on that
theory, its courts should have jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns; (2) the recogni-
tion that communist countries benefitted from the absolute theory, which afford-
ed immunity to state-owned enterprises but not to private companies of non-
communist countries; and (3) the fact that the growth of governmental involvement
in commercial activites necessitated a means by which interest parties may have
their rights and duties determined by courts.
26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 948 (1952).
" The purpose of the legislation was (1) to "codify the.., restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity;" (2) to "transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branches
to the judicial branch" as a way of ensuring both legal consistency and procedural due pro-
cess; (3) to establish a "procedure for making service upon, and obtaining in personam
jurisdiction over, a foreign state," thereby obviating the need in most cases for seizure or
attachment of a foreign sovereign's property; and (4) to change the rule that absolutely
guarded a sovereign's property from seizure in execution of a judgment. Id. at 6605-06. H.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [19761 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6606.
5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6606 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HISTORY].
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Comisario General, a suit against the Spanish consul to compel ar-
bitration,' although the court noted that neither the Tate
Letter nor the courts or commentators had suggested a satisfac-
tory test for distinguishing public from private acts. The "nature
of the transaction" approach used by some European courts had
yielded "astonishing" results. 1 Under this approach, only func-
tions which could not be performed by individuals could be
characterized as sovereign, thereby limiting sovereign acts to a
very narrow range of activity. Thus, the "nature of the transac-
tion" approach exposed governments to an unacceptably high
degree of potential liability. As an alternative to the "nature of
the transaction," the court considered the "purpose of the transac-
tion" approach to differentiate public and private acts. Under the
"purpose" test, any government scheme having a public purpose
would be deemed a public act. This approach was equally unaccep-
table to the court because it immunized too much government con-
duct-a public purpose could be found in almost any pursuit
undertaken by governments. The difficulties encountered have
led many to declare that the distinction between acts jure imperii
and acts jure gestionio is "unworkable."'
In order to find a workable alternative, the Victory Transport
court devised its own "traditional activities" approach. This doc-
trine limited immunity to "strictly political or public acts about
which sovereigns have traditionally been quite sensitive." The
five categories that were deemed sufficiently sensitive to justify
"sacrificing the interests of private litigants to international com-
ity" were:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; [and]
(5) public loans.2"
The FSIA incorporates aspects of both the nature of the trans-
action approach and the purpose of the transaction approach to
distinguish public and private acts. In general, the statute ex-
cludes from immunity all "commercial activity," defined as either
a course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial act.'
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
, Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
"Id.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), 1603(d) (1976). 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) provides in part that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
108 [Vol. 11:1
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The nature of the activity rather than its purpose determines
whether the activity is commercial. 5 However, in claims involving
public debts, the governmental purpose is to be determinative.'
By adopting the "commercial activity" exception, Congress ex-
cluded from immunity an area that has traditionally been outside
the scope of sensitive government activities. Commercial activity
should be defined broadly because the "nature of the activity"
test was chosen over the "'purposes" test. Furthermore, Congress
intended to give the courts a "great deal of latitude" in determin-
ing what is commercial.' Therefore, few, if any, commercial ac-
tivities were meant to be given immunity under the FSIA.
There is little reason to doubt that Congress expected an-
ticompetitive commercial activities to come within the purview of
section 1605. Nevertheless, it was argued in Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Pezetel that commercial activity is limited to ordinary legal
disputes based on private contract or tort claims.' Support for
this view lies in the emphasis given to these types of actions in
the legislative history of the FSIA. In Outboard Marine, the court
did not accept this argument, but relied instead on the broad, un-
qualified language of the statute.9 A closer look at the legislative
history, however, reveals concern about anticompetitive conduct.
States or of the States in any case... in which the action is based upon a commer-
cial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
The Act defines "commercial activity" as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or
a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
Id. at § 1606(b).
" H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 1615. This view was not taken in International
Assoc. of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 567 (C.D. Cal. 1979). In that case, the court
narrowly construed "commercial activity" partially because of the sensitive nature of the sub-
ject, but primarily because the court thought its ruling must rest on specific facts.
Although every case should turn on its specific facts, this does not necessarily mean that
"commercial activity" was intended to be given a narrow interpretation.
The only situation that would call for a narrow construction is where a government func-
tion involves both commercial activity and non-commercial activities. In such a situation, it
would be overbroad to characterize the entire function as commercial by virtue of some of
its component activities. Instead, the individual activity should be examined to determine
its nature. For example, even though the purchase of army boots could be characterized as
commercial, this would not make all military activity commercial in nature. The OPEC case
was the subject of a Recent Development appearing in 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 141 (1980).
461 F. Supp. 384, 395 (D. Del. 1978).
"Id.
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In a statement submitted during hearings on the bill, the fear was
expressed that "application of U.S. antitrust authority to collusive
efforts of foreign governments via cartels may be jeopardized by
broad interpretations of sovereign immunity."30  Moreover,
Representative Jordan of Texas asked Monroe Leigh, legal ad-
viser to the State Department, whether this bill would aid citizens
who were harmed by the Arab boycott of Jewish businesses. Mr.
Leigh replied that this "bill would provide the means for commen-
cing such a lawsuit.""1 In fact, the earlier 1973 hearings on the act
contemplated that "an action [could be brought] arising out of
restrictive trade practices by an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state."'32
Commercial activities of foreign governments that have "direct
effect" inside the United States come within the § 1605(a)(2) excep-
tion to sovereign immunity. The classic illustration for application
of such an exception is where a Canadian factory emits smoke that
crosses the border and causes damage., By analogy, direct
economic harm, as well as physical harm, was contemplated by the
act. Thus, a government in the business of exporting to the United
States would be liable for any business torts causing direct injury
in the United States.' Because an antitrust action is a tort or in
the nature of a tort action,' it follows that a foreign government
should be liable for violations of United States antitrust law.
Recoverable damages in tort, however, are limited by the FSIA.
so Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, Hearings on H.R. 11313
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 HEARINGS].
" Id. at 52-53. Admittedly, the FSIA did not add to the substantive terms of the antitrust
laws for "neither the term 'direct effect' nor the concept of 'substantial contacts' embodied
in section 1603(e) is intended to alter the application of the Sherman Act to any defendant."
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 6616. See Kestenbaum, The Antitrust Challenge to
the Arab Boycott: Per Se Theory, Middle East Politics and United States v. Bechtel Corp.,
54 TEX. L. REV. 1411 (1976); Comment, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (1962); Comment, The Arab
Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of United States v. Bechtel in Light of the Export Ad-
ministration Amendments of 1977, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1440 (1979).
's Immunities of Foreign States, Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims
and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 41
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 HEARINGS].
11 Id. See also Trial Smelter Arbitration (United States-Canada), Decision of Mar. 11,
1941, United States Department of State, 8 Arbitration Series (1941); Reprinted in 35 AM.
J. INT'L L. 684-734 (1941); cited in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, § 18, Reporters' Note 3, 55 (1965).
, H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 1613; 1976 HEARINGS, supra note 30, at 28.
Solomon v. Houston, 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Adams v. A.B.A., 400
F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Penn. 1975).
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No punitive (as in treble) damages are allowed against the foreign
state itself, although such penalties are allowed against in-
strumentalities or agencies of the state.'
Nothing in the language of the FSIA or in its legislative history
precludes antitrust liability for foreign governments. This omis-
sion has prompted the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment to conclude that sovereign immunity is no longer a barrier
to potential liability for governments acting in a "proprietary"
capacity. In making enforcement decisions, the Justice Depart-
ment intends to avoid "unnecessary" interference with govern-
ment functions. 7
Despite the absence of express limitations on antitrust liability
in the FSIA, opponents of liability find implied restraints. The
prinicipal argument is that antitrust enforcement would upset in-
ternational comity, one of the remaining justifications for sover-
eign immunity. Because antitrust laws are not universally ac-
cepted, it is argued that their application to some foreign govern-
ments would be particularly irritating.'
In recent years, Western European countries have begun
actively enforcing their laws governing restrictive trade prac-
tices, and they have had little experience with extraterritorial ap-
plications. 9 In contrast to the FSIA, which extends liability to
commercial activity outside the United States, the European Con-
' 28 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (1976). This limitation on damages is discussed in Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. at 394-95. The case raises the interesting question of how to
distinguish a government from a government instrumentality or agency. Under the FSIA,
three requirements must be satisfied for an entity to qualify as an agency or instrumentali-
ty. First, the entity must be a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise., Second, it
must be a political subdivision or an organ of a foreign state, or a foreign state must have a
majority ownership interest in it. Third, the entity must be neither a citizen of a state of
the United States nor be created by the laws of any third country. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)
(1976).
"7 JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977),
reprinted in P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 64 (1978 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as AN-
TITRUST GUIDE]. See letter from Department of Justice, May 6, 1980, concerning the pending
uranium cartel antitrust litigation and expressing concern with possible foreign comity im-
plications. TRADE REG. REP. 50,416 (CCH).
See, e.g., Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends: Canada and the United States
in the Mid-1970's, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165 (1978); and Maechling, Uncle Sam's Long Arm,
63 A.B.A.J. 372 (1972). See also Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Department's Antitrust
Guide for International Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215 (1978). Ninety percent of
developed nations and about fifty percent of the larger developing nations have antitrust
laws of some sort, or use similar rules in screening investment. Nearly one hundred small
countries may have no such laws at all. Davidow, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Code,
13 INT'L LAW. 587 (1980).
" H. ZWARENSTEYN, SOME ASPECTS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE AMERICAN
ANTITRUST LAWS 11 (1970).
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vention on State Immunity limits liability to business activity con-
ducted from an office "on the territory of the State of the
forum."'" Despite the limited provisions of the Convention on
State Immunity, European government enterprises are subject to
the provisions in the EEC Treaty that prohibit anticompetitive
behavior. "Ordinarily, public enterprises are subject to the rules
of competition in exactly the same way as private enterprises....
Not only do the competition rules apply directly to government
enterprises, inasmuch as they are enterprises," but certain duties
are imposed "on the governments themselves."' 1
The differences that may exist between the laws of competition
in the United States and in Western Europe should not preclude
the extention of United States antitrust laws to the commercial
activities of those governments. In § 1605(a)(2), the FSIA extends
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States courts over
foreign governments almost as far as the already existing reach of
jurisdiction over extraterritorial private activities. As indicated
above, prior to the FSIA, United States foreign relations law per-
mitted the regulation of extraterritorial activity, even though the
United States law was not totally consistent with the laws in other
countries. Where United States laws are different, the regulated
foreign activity must have a direct, substantial, and foreseeable ef-
fect within the United States. Furthermore, the regulation cannot
be in violation of principles of justice generally recognized by coun-
tries with reasonably developed legal systems.'" Antitrust liability
for foreign governments should meet these requirements because
neither restrictive sovereign immunity nor regulation of an-
ticompetitive commercial activity are in opposition to generally ac-
cepted principles of justice.
The differences between the legal systems of Western Europe
and the United States are not so great as to cause serious friction
European Convention on State Immunity, article 7. reprinted in 1976 HEARINGS, supra
note 30, at 39. The FSIA was influenced greatly by the European Convention. Rep. David-
son of California asked Mr. Leigh of the State Department whether there was "any incon-
sistency between the new convention and this bill?" Mr. Leigh replied that except for the
FSIA's execution provisions, the FSIA and the European Convention were generally the
same. 1976 HEARINGS, supra note 30, at 37.
' G. van Hecke, Government Enterprises and National Monopolies Under the E.E.C.
Treaty, 3 COMM. MET. L. REV. 450, 452 (1966).
,1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(b)
(1965). This section generally involves matters of an economic nature. The foreseeability
condition does not require subjective intent. Id. at Comment f. Legislation (S. 1010) to
establish a study commission to examine the international application of United States an-
titrust laws died in the House Committees on the Judiciary and Foreign Affairs.
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and injury to international comity." However, the differences be-
tween the United States and nonmarket or developing nations are
considerably more pronounced. In this context, distinguishing
between "sovereign" and "commercial" activities of governments
becomes more complicated; the distinctions may be difficult to
draw unless the two governments distinguish the two concepts in
a similar way. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is
of the view that particular cases "may turn in part on questions of
foreign law, custom, and practice.""
The concept of legally enforced competition is alien to com-
munist national economies. In Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna
Elektrarna Krsko, the district court held that Yugoslavia's com-
munist system of property ownership was not determinative of
the question of sovereign immunity. 5 A similar result was reached
in an antitrust case involving the Polish government's manufac-
ture of golf carts. In that case, the court held that "it does not
follow that because a business in such a country has objectives
and government ties alien to those of enterprises in a capitalist
system that each such business is equal in stature to the govern-
ment under which it operates."'
The problem of applying restrictive immunity to communist
governments was foreseen in the deliberations that led to the
passage of the FSIA. Although the state trading agencies in these
countries attempt to invoke sovereign immunity, "the U.S. has
been steadfast in refusing to recognize that [defense] and so have
nearly all countries."" In fact, "one of the motivations for the
development of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was
the fact that the Soviet Union in the 1920s was acting through
state trading corporations, which claimed immunity."'8 Although
such countries normally will assert sovereign immunity, "they
realize that the restrictive theory is the international law princi-
ple that is applied in the countries in which they trade."'9 Conse-
," Of course, the British government has been considering legislation to repudiate the ex-
traterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. See, e.g., Britain to Limit Reach of U.S. An-
titrust Laws, London Financial Times, Sept. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
" ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 37, at 66 n.21.
" 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977). See 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111 (1978). Outside of their
sheltered national economies, communist governments are no strangers to competition.
" Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 396 (D. Del. 1978).
" 1976 HEARINGS, supra note 30, at 56 (statement of Monroe Leigh).
"Id.
" Id. See generally Cooper, Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: Further Inquiry, 11
Loy. CHI. L.J. 193 (1980).
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quently, they have waived sovereign immunity in many interna-
tional agreements.
The situation in the developing countries differs from that in
Western Europe or communist bloc countries. In developing na-
tions, the problem stems not from the legal or economic organiza-
tion, but rather from the position of competitive disadvantage to
which these countries historically have been relegated. In addition
to being disadvantaged competitively and exploited, many of
these countries are dependent on a few basic commodities for
generation of national income. Commodity producers have an in-
herent interest in conserving their natural resources.'
The special situation of commodity producers has been recog-
nized by the United Nations General Assembly, which has re-
solved that a government has sole and permanent sovereignty
over its natural resources." Furthermore, "all states have a right
to associate in organizations of primary commodity producers."' 2
There is, however, an implied limitation in these declarations. The
right of all states "to dispose of their natural wealth and
resources" should be exercised with "respect for the economic in-
dependence of states."' The purpose of these resolutions has been
to stop foreign exploitation of dominant economic positions. Tradi-
tionally, this exploitation has come from Western commodity con-
sumer nations. As has been demonstrated by the OPEC cartel, ex-
ploitation can also come from the monopolistic position of many
commodity producer nations. In either event, the economic effect
is the same.' Any exploitation undermines the "economic in-
dependence" of dependent nations and intrudes upon their rights
of sovereignty.
In the OPEC case, wherein the court pointed out that the
United States was a signatory to many of these U.N. resolutions,
it was held that international law should be followed in determin-
See Timberg, supra note 16, at 28-29, 37.
'1 G.A. Res. 1803, § (1), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 327, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A.
Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 51, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
" Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, ch. 11, art. 2(1), 29
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
" G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 51.
" To a certain extent, it is justifiable in order for developing nations to catch up with in-
dustrialized nations. Even under this rationale, if the exploitation is against other develop-
ing nations as well as industrialized nations, it is unjustifiable. Moreover, exploitation
should not continue if it jeopardizes the economic health of another nation. However
justified, the exploitation should stop once a position of rough equality has been reached.
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ing what is "commercial."' Nevertheless, the FSIA was passed
after the aforementioned U.N. resolutions, and its legislative
history makes no mention of them." The history of the Act clearly
indicates that state "mining enterprises" or "mineral extraction"
ventures were to be included in "commercial activities."" In a
statement submitted to the subcommittee hearings on the bill,
specific reference was made to the growing involvement of
foreign governments in the market of raw materials. "In the
resource area, state-owned firms now predominate in the oil fields
in many developing countries."'  There is no evidence that a
double standard or a special status for developing nations was in-
tended by the bill. On the contrary, concern was expressed about
the collusive activities of commodity producers. Therefore, it may
be argued that developing nations should be treated in the same
manner as other countries under the FSIA.
The reason for concern over the incongruity of United States
antitrust law and the laws of other countries is international comi-
ty. Comity is related to the original rationale for sovereign im-
munity, respect for the dignity of governments, except that it con-
tains a greater element of practicality. Disrespect for the dignity
of other governments will result in disharmonious relations
among countries. ° Assuming that comity is still a major concern
underlying restrictive sovereign immunity, it remains to be seen
whether comity justifies a total exemption of foreign governments
from United States antitrust laws. International law recognized a
International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 567.
Assuming, arguendo, that a General Assembly Resolution is international law, it is
nevertheless superseded by conflicting national legislation that is subsequent in time. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that "an Act of Congress ... is on full parity with
a treaty" and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is "inconsistent with a treaty,
the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18
(1957).
", H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 1613, 6615. The OPEC court stated that pro-
prietary interest in oil companies were just one "medium" or "format" through which
governmental interests were being accomplished, 477 F. Supp. at 569 n.14. This sounds
very much like the "government purposes" test which was rejected by the FSIA. See note
27 suprm
W 1976 HEARINGS, supra note 30, at 71 (statement of Monroe Leigh).
According to a State Department legal adviser, the purpose of sovereign immunity
in modern international law is "not to protect the sensitivities of other governments, but
rather "to promote the functioning of all governments by protecting a state from the
burden of defending laws suits abroad which are based on its public acts." Id. at 27. (state-
ment of Monroe Leigh).
'e See, e.g., R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1964).
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lesser degree of immunity for the commercial acts of govern-
ments.
Comity is not the single objective of United States foreign
policy to which all other policies must be sacrificed. It must be
balanced with other competing interests. The strong policy behind
United States antitrust laws is among those interests. In addition,
comity implicitly includes notions of reciprocity and fairness.
Foreign governments wishing to participate in the United States
market should respect the laws of that marketplace. As long as
those laws are enforced in a nondiscriminatory manner, there
should be no cause for complaint." The antitrust laws do not in-
terfere with exclusively internal affairs of foreign governments.
As indicated above, Sherman Act jurisdiction exists only when
conduct overseas has a substantial, foreseeable effect on United
States commerce. Moreover, foreign governments and interna-
tional trade benefit when the channels of trade are kept free from
anticompetitive restraints. 2 That foreign goverments benefit
from United States antitrust laws was well illustrated in Pfizer v.
Government of India.' Having accepted the protection of United
States laws, and seeking to profit from trade in the United States
domestic market, foreign governments should observe the com-
mands of United States antitrust laws.?
III. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Alongside sovereign immunity, there developed a related legal
principle, the act of state doctrine, which also has served to shield
foreign governments from antitrust liability. The two doctrines
" Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. at 390.
2 T. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 77-80 (1970).
434 U.S. 308 (1978).
The courts have held that the "immunity of a foreign state is judge-made law. It does not
rest on the Constitution or any federal statute." Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 609 (5th Cir.
1965); see also National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 358 (1954). Thus,
Congress clearly had the power in the FSIA to modify or eliminate sovereign immunity.
Some commentators, ignoring the literal terms of the statute and without citation to
legislative history or other authority, have concluded that Congress could not have in-
tended the admittedly serious result of allowing antitrust suits against foreign govern-
ments. Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Act of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1248, 1255 (1977). A more plausible presumption exists, however, that because the
courts have article III and statutory jurisdiction over foreign states, in general, and when
Sherman Act jurisdiction otherwise would apply to particular conduct affecting the United
States economy, Congress specifically provided in the FSIA that the courts had an obliga-
tion to decide private antitrust actions against foreign governments acting in a commercial
capacity.
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resemble each other and have often been confused. Thus, it is
useful to examine their differences. The act of state doctrine may,
under proper circumstances, be invoked by either a government
or a private defendant; sovereign immunity is reserved solely for
governments. Whereas sovereign immunity deprives a court of
jurisdiction, act of state only removes certain issues from con-
sideration by a court. Finally, unlike sovereign immunity, the act
of state doctrine is not a matter of international law as it only ap-
plies to acts done within the territory of the foreign state.6 5
The original rationale for the act of state doctrine was similar to
that for sovereign immunity: courts should respect the dignity of
other governments when acting within their proper sphere. The
classic statement of the doctrine is found in Underhill v. Her-
nandez:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the Government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by the sovereign powers as between themselves."'
According to the modern formulation of the act of state doc-
trine, three conditions are prerequisite to its application. There
must be:
(1) a public act,
(2) committed by a foreign government recognized by the
United States, and
(3) occurring within the territory of the foreign state.
The act of state need not be in accordance with international law."
Most of the early act of state cases involved the expropriation
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 43(1)
(1965).
" 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The Supreme Court never has indicated "clearly where the
court found the rule and why it is proper to apply it." Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Powers
of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964). Henkin suggests that Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), interpreting the Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, 34, 1 Stat. 92, may have been an original basis for the assertion that the doc-
trine did not originate in an international setting.
I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 41-43
(1965).
" As F.A. Mann has noted, the "alleged sacrosanctity of the foreign act of state finds no
support in the judicial practice of any country outside the Anglo-American sphere of legal
influence and Holland. No international tribunal has ever adopted it." Mann, International
Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts, 70 L.Q. REV. 181, 198 (1954).
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of property by foreign governments. In American Banana v.
United Fruit Co., Justice Holmes extended the doctrine to cover
claims involving antitrust violations. 9 Later cases"0 left the validi-
ty of American Banana's broad holdings in doubt. Although these
doubts apparently were undercut in Occidental Petroleum Corp.
v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.71 and Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Tex-
aco Maracaibo, Inc.,"2 which reaffirmed that part of American
Banana regarding the act of state doctrine, the Supreme Court
has not upheld an act of state defense in an antitrust case since
1909.
The 1962 case Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino announced
the modern rationale for the act of state doctrine." Following the
policy set forth in sovereign immunity cases, the Court stated that
the main purpose of the act of state doctrine was to preserve the
separation of powers in national government. Foreign relations
should remain the primary concern of the executive branch
because of its constitutional duties and special expertise in that
field. Furthermore, the court stressed that the judiciary should
avoid embarrassing the executive branch in its conduct of foreign
relations. Thus, the Court has identified two related considera-
tions underlying the doctrine: (1) the absence of settled or ascer-
tainable legal standards by which the validity of a foreign state's
public act may be measured; and (2) the risk that a judicial
declaration of the validity or invalidity of the act of a foreign state
may conflict with the positions of the political branches on the
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
"0 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1961); and
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1926).
7, 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
" 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). A subsequent case, Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d
68.(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977), purported to expand the act of state doctrine
to preclude all judicial inquiry into the motivations of public officials, even when they are
not defendants in a suit. This view has been regarded as overbroad. Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. at 397. See also Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d
48, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1979). Act of state does not offer blank check immunity. Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). Where it is applicable, it only
precludes determining (1) the validity of the act (directly or collaterally) and (2) judicial
redress for the act. Occidental Petroleum v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. at 109. It
does not preclude an inquiry to determine causation. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d at
79.
Interestingly, however, the controversy between the parties in the Occidental Petroleum
case subsequently arose in the courts of the United Kingdom. The judges of the Court of
Appeal, Civil Division, came to a conclusion contrary to the Ninth Circuit's concerning the
application of the act of state doctrine. The well-reasoned opinions analyzed the distinctions
between the act of state doctrine and other related doctrines. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Ham-
mer, 11975] 2 All E.R. 51.
" 376 U.S. 398 (1962).
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matter and thus interfere with or embarrass the conduct of
foreign relations by those branches."
Implicit in the notion of separation of powers is an exception to
the act of state doctrine. The considerations underlying the doc-
trine do not call for its application "where it is clear that the ex-
ecutive branch of the government does not consider inquiry into
the act of a foreign state inimical to its conduct of foreign policy."' 5
In such a situation, "there would appear to be no reason for the
court to abstain from a ruling on the merits."" This view of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law reflects the result reached
in Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Moatschappy."
In Bernstein, the Second Circuit relied upon a State Depart-
ment press release to avoid applying the act of state doctrine in a
postwar claim involving an act of Nazi Germany. Initially, other
courts did not favorably receive the so-called Bernstein exception.
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court avoided applying the Bernstein
exception, leaving its validity in doubt." In Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. First National City Bank, the Second Circuit withdrew
from its earlier position, stating that Bernstein was a unique case
which stemmed from a wartime act involving a government no
longer in existence. 9 The equities were entirely on the plaintiff's
side. Noting that Bernstein had never been relied upon successful-
ly, the court held that it should be limited to its facts and not be
relied upon unless there was a more official pronouncement by the
executive branch. The Supreme Court reversed, with a plurality
holding that "where the executive branch . . . expressly
represents to the court that application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that
doctrine should not be applied by the courts."" The rationale was
simply the old maxim, "the reason for the law ceasing, the law
itself should cease."8 Because a majority of the justices did not
join in this opinion, the validity of the Bernstein exception is still
in doubt.
" I&. at 423. See also First National City Bank v. Banco National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
765-68, 788 (1972).
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41, Com-
ment h (1965).
75 Id.
7 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
11 376 U.S. at 420.
79 442 F.2d 530, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1971).
"0 First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972).
81 Id.
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In repeated pronouncements, both the executive and legislative
branches of government have sought to reduce the application of
the act of state doctrine."2 Shortly after the Sabbatino case, Con-
gress passed the Hickenlooper, "anti-Sabbatino" amendment re-
quiring courts to consider foreign confiscation cases on their
merits, unless the President suggests otherwise." Disenchant-
ment with the act of state doctrine is also readily apparent in the
hearings leading to the passage of the FSIA."
Although the FSIA did not expressly alter the act of state doc-
trine, Congress clearly indicated that the doctrine was closely in-
tertwined with sovereign immunity. 5 Logically, they cannot be
treated as separate and unrelated doctrines, but must be con-
sidered together. Not to do so would nullify the results of the
FSIA. The House committee was of the opinion that "in some
cases, after the defense of sovereign immunity has been denied or
removed as an issue, the act of state doctrine may be improperly
asserted to block litigation."" The committee was very much con-
cerned with the potential for circumventing restrictive sovereign
immunity by letting absolute immunity "re-enter through the
back door under the guise of the act of state doctrine."'
Such circumvention was attempted in Alfred Dunhill v.
Republic of Cuba." According to the State Department's counsel,
U Both the State Department and the Justice Department have spoken for the executive
branch. A letter from the legal adviser for the State Department to the Solicitor General
stated: "[it] is our view that if the Court should decide to overrule the holding in Sabbatino so
that acts of state would thereafter be subject to adjudication in American courts under in-
ternational law, we would not anticipate embarrassment to the conduct of the foreign policy
of the United States." (Washington, Nov. 26, 1975). Reprinted in Alfred Dunhill v. Republic
of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 706, Appendix 1.
Likewise, the Justice Department has stated that the act of state is not a bar to antitrust
actions when: (1) the act occurred inside the United States; (2) the act was not that of a truly
sovereign entity acting within the scope of its powers; or (3) the act was commercial. ANTI-
TRUST GUIDE, supra note 37, at 97. In its amicus brief in the Hunt case, the Justice Depart-
ment took the position that since the act of state doctrine rests on principles of judicial
abstention rather than jurisdictional or constitutional commands, it "thus constitutes a
limited exception to the ordinary obligation of courts to adjudicate cases and controversies
over which they have jurisdiction." Justice Department Brief as amicus curiae at 8-9, Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
See generally Cooper, Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: Further Inquiry, 11 LoY.
CHI. L.J. 193 (1980).
" According to Mr. Leigh of the State Department, "when you're discussing the
sovereign immunity question, you also have to worry about the act of state question." 1976
HEARINGS, supra note 30, at 33.
N H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 6619.
87 Id.
u 425 U.S. 682 (1975).
Dunhill "did not initially turn on sovereign immunity, for the sim-
ple reason that the attorneys for the government of Cuba were
aware [that it] would probably have been rejected."89 Fortunately,
the Supreme Court was unpersuaded by this ploy and held there
was no act of state.90 Citing this decision, the House committee
found "it unnecessary to address the act of state doctrine in this
[FSIA] legislation because decisions such as that in the Dunhill
case demonstrate that our courts already have considerable
guidance enabling them to reject improper assertions of the act of
state doctrine." 91
Despite re-emergence in antitrust cases, the general trend has
been for courts to narrow the application of act of state. This
trend is evident in the re-defining of the basic requirements of the
doctrine. The first requirement is that there be a "public act."
This requirement is inherently difficult to define. It must suffice
to compare examples of judicial holdings in specific factual situa-
tions. An element of formality is probably involved, but it is by no
means conclusive. The Dunhill plurality emphasized that "[n]o
statute, decree, order or resolution of the Cuban Government
itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba . . . as a
sovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts due."9
Reacting sharply to this statement, the dissent argued that
[w]hile it is true that an act of state generally takes the form of
an executive or legislative step formalized in a decree or
measure, that is only because duly constituted governments
generally act through formal means. When they do not, their
acts are no less the acts of a state."
Nonaction or refusals to act have been held to be acts of state.'
Situations involving acts that are less likely to be held acts of
state include actions by agents95 or instrumentalities." The deter-
" 1976 HEARINGS, supra note 30, at 33.
"0 Other courts have also rejected the act of state in circumstances where sovereign im-
munity has been initially raised and rejected. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.
Supp. 397; see also National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 19, at 6619.
Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 695.
Id. at 718-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976); see also French v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 242 N.E.2d 704 (1968).
" Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1975).
" Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978). See also United
States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), cited for this
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mining factors in these cases are the scope of authority delegated
and the degree of separation and independence involved. Another
type of act that is unlikely to qualify as an act of state is a judicial
determination. According to the Restatement (Second), a court ad-
judication may be an act of state. However, typically, it is not,
either because it involves the interests of private litigants or
because court decisions are not the usual way in which the state
gives effect to its public interests.97 Similar considerations
preclude the granting of a patent from being construed as an act
of state."
In contrast to the above situations, expropriation of property is
almost always considered to be an act of state, even if it involves
commercial property." The explanation for the different treat-
ment is that such decisions usually involve a considered choice of
government policy. On the other hand, the court in Dunhill held a
repudiation of commercial debt not to be an act of state."'0 Point-
ing to the distinction between commercial acts and public or
government acts under restrictive sovereign immunity, the
plurality intended to create a "commercial act" exception to the
doctrine. The opinion stated that sovereign immunity and act of
state must always be considered together. Furthermore, it was
argued that holding foreign governments liable for their commer-
cial acts would not likely offend them.
The dissent in Dunhill countered by stressing that restrictive
sovereign immunity as yet had not been codified and that its
parameters were unclear. More importantly, the dissent em-
phasized that sovereign immunity and act of state are different.
Under Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine required a case by case
analysis rather than sweeping exceptions. 1
Critics of Dunhill have questioned the validity of the commer-
cial exception holding. The Court actually found that there was no
act of state involved; the discussion of a commercial exception was
mere dicta. Moreover, only four justices concurred with the com-
proposition by the Supreme Court in McGrath v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 338 U.S. 241, 250 n.12
(1949). The FSIA maintains this distinction.
"1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 Com-
ment d (1965). See also Timberlane v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
" Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). See 9 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 145 (1980).
" Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977). See also D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mex-
icanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976).
425 U.S. 682 (1976).
" 425 U.S. at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Reference was being made to Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
[Vol. 11:1
mercial exception holding; the other five disagreed. Although the
strength of this holding may be doubtful, it has been cited or
observed as precedent by lower federal courts. 02
Whether an antitrust violation could be considered an act of
state should depend on the facts of the case. Such conduct would
undoubtedly be commercial, but it might involve a considered
choice of public policy. ' The determination is facilitated if a
separate and independent government entity doing business is in-
volved. Separate government corporations have been held liable
for antitrust violations.' 4
The second major requirement of the act of state doctrine is
that the act taken place within the territory of the state. A recur-
ring example of this requirement is found in expropriation cases.
Although a United States court will respect the decision of a
foreign government to confiscate property lying within the
borders of the foreign state, it will not uphold a similar decision
involving property located in the United States' 5 or in a third
country.'" This rule is followed regardless of whether the proper-
ty is tangible or intangible.' ° However, ascertaining the location
of property might be more difficult in the case of intangible prop-
erty.
Determining the place of the act is no easy task in antitrust cases.
In the antitrust context, it helps to draw a distinction between an
act and its effects. The effects must be felt within the United
States and must be direct.' 8 In other contexts, courts have said
that an indirect effect outside of the foreign state does not
preclude act of state.' 9 However, the effects cannot be too at-
tenuated.' 0 Although the physical consequences of an act of state
may be unlimited, its legally insulated consequences are not
unlimited.
10, Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d at 79. See also Industrial Inv. Dev. v. Mitsui & Co.,
594 F.2d at 52.
.03 The politically motivated Arab boycott of Jewish business is one example.
104 The position of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is that "state-owned
or controlled firms, will be expected to observe the prohibitions of our antitrust laws." AN-
TITRUST GUIDE, supra note 37, at 66.
' Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 355 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
'0 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
,v Id. This case involved a confiscated trademark.
'o This "direct effect" requirement is necessary under both the FSIA and the Illinois
Brick line of antitrust cases. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
109 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. at 911.
110 National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. at 640. The court cited
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), as authority. The line may
be drawn at the point where the effects become unforeseeable.
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The difficulties entailed have led one commentator to conclude
that the location requirement is inapplicable in the antitrust con-
text."' Such a conclusion draws implied support from the Restate-
ment (Second), which stresses that the requirement refers to an
act affecting some form of intangible interest.112 Nevertheless,
competition could be considered analogous to a form of duty giv-
ing rise to an intangible right or interest. Thus, it would not be
unreasonable to hold that this requirement must still be met by
foreign governments attempting to invoke the act of state doc-
trine in defense to an antitrust suit. It may be very difficult for a
foreign government to disprove that its anticompetitive practices
have not had a direct impact in the United States.
If the foreign government cannot counter the plaintiffs conten-
tion of direct effects within the United States it will not receive
the full benefit of the act of state defense. At this stage of
analysis, the foreign act is judged according to conflict of laws
principles.'13 The foreign act will be upheld only if to do so would
be consistent with the policy and law of the United States."' That
is, "where there is confliction between our public policy and comi-
ty, our sense of justice and equity as embodied in our public policy
must prevail."11
Even at the stage where conflict of law analysis takes the place
of act of state analysis, antitrust laws should not automatically ap-
ply to violations by foreign states. Areeda and Turner caution
that "substantive antitrust analysis must not be applied
mechanically where foreign contacts are involved-not even in
the so-called per se area. More subtlety is required.""11 In addition
.. Griffen, American Antitrust Law and Foreign Governments, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
137, 141 (1978). The commentator cited Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) as support for this view.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 43 (1965).
The act of state doctrine "does not prevent examination of the validity of an act of a foreign
state with respect to a thing located, or an interest localized, outside of its territory .. "
Id. The comments to this section all refer to property. No mention is made of competition as a
localized interest.
" Conflict of laws analysis roughly corresponds to act of state analysis abroad. The
courts of France, West Germany, and the Netherlands will respect a foreign act of state
unless it is contrary to public policy. Id. § 41, Reporters Note 4.
Increasingly, courts in other countries will not give effect to foreign acts of state which
violate international law (such as expropriation). This does not seem to have caused serious
foreign relations problems for the countries concerned. Letter from the legal advisor of the
State Department to the Solicitor General, November 26, 1975, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill
v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 704, App. 1.
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 43,
Reporters Note 1.
"' Vladikankaysky R.R. v. N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1936).
116 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 37, at 278.
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to finding the requisite effects, a court should take into considera-
tion international comity and fairness.117
The Timberlane court adopted a balancing approach at this
stage of analysis."8 Endorsing this approach, the Mannington
Mills court listed ten, factors for consideration:
(1) degree of conflict between each country's laws and policy;
(2) nationality of the parties;
(3) relative importance of a violation here and abroad;
(4) available remedies abroad and pending litigation;
(5) intended or foreseeable harm to the United States;
(6) effect on foreign relations;
(7) whether relief will force parties to perform illegal acts;
(8) whether a court order can be effectuated;
(9) whether a similar order coming from abroad would be
accepted here;
(10) whether a treaty is involved."9
Against these considerations of reciprocity, comity, and limita-
tions on judicial power, the importance of United States antitrust
policy and the Congressional purpose in adopting the FSIA must
be weighed. Courts should avoid needlessly thwarting the goals of
United States antitrust law, 20 and likewise should avoid abnegating
the protected rights of citizens to litigate valid grievances within
the courts' jurisdiction. It has been noted that unlike expropriation
cases, antitrust cases involve both public and private injury."'
IV. SCOPE OF COVERAGE UNDER ANTITRUST STATUTES
Perhaps the most substantial obstacle to bringing an antitrust
action against a foreign government is the wording of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts themselves. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
.. Timberlane v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). One possible balancing ap-
proach for deciding whether to apply United States antitrust law is Professor Currie's
.governmental interest" methodology, a means for reconciling the conflicting interests of na-
tions. Where there is an apparent conflict between the interests of two states, the court should
consider a moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of either state in
order to avoid conflict. If, after moderation of the conflicting policies, a conflict remains, the
law of the forum (United States) will prevail. W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
470 (1977).
Even under the traditional conflict of laws rule, the result might be the same. That is, in
a tort action (as antitrust suits have been characterized), the law of the place of injury, lex
loci delecti, would govern.
i" 549 F.2d at 613-14.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d at 1297.
"= Industrial Inv. Dev. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d at 54-55.
... Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d at 1293.
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provides in part that "[e]very person who shall make any contract
or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony....""2 Moreover, "person"
or "persons" includes "corporations and associations existing under
or authorized by the laws of the Territories, the laws of any state, or
the laws of a foreign country." 123
Although no governments, state or foreign, were included ex-
pressly in this definition, none were excluded either."' A brief
look into the scheme behind the antitrust laws lays the foundation
for analysis of whether governments should be included within
their present scope. The Sherman and Clayton Acts are among
the simplest of statutes found in the United States Code. They
have changed relatively little during the ninety and sixty-six
years of their respective existence. This simplicity and longevity
is indicative of the interpretation that should be attached to them.
The Supreme Court has described the Sherman Act as the
"Magna Carta of free enterprise."' 1 This "charter of freedom" is
engrained with "a generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."'" Even in the
sphere of extraterritorial application, the Sherman Act has been
held to be a congressional exercise of the "full scope . .. [of]
powers under the commerce clause of the Constitution."'"
Against this background, it is not surprising that courts
generally have given "persons" an expansive reading. In Georgia
v. Evans, the Supreme Court held that a state government was a
"person" for purposes of being, a plaintiff under the Sherman
Act. 8 In the same year, in United States v. Cooper Corp., the Court
recognized that
there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the sub-
ject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the ex-
ecutive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis added).
' Id § 12.
... For purposes of this section of the note, cases relating to both state and foreign
governments shall be considered together. Of course, considerations of federalism, a major
concern with state governments, are not present in the foreign national government con-
text.
" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 398.
" Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
"' Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
316 U.S. 159 (1941).
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which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring
state or nation within the scope of the law. '"
Two years after Evans, however, the Supreme Court in Parker
v. Brown held that a California regulatory scheme, aimed at main-
taining and stabilizing the prices for agricultural products, was
exempt from antitrust laws.'" This gave rise to the so-called state
action exemption or Parker doctrine. 13 Although this case
restricted antitrust liability for certain state actions, it did not
reach that result through a literal interpretation. Instead, the
Court searched the legislative history but failed to discover any
intent to restrain this sort of state activity.'a Here, the state "as
sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government."' 33 A
question that was left unanswered was the possible liability of a
state which entered into a "combination [with others] for restraint
of trade."1
Thirty-five years passed before the Supreme Court directly con-
fronted the question of a government's status within the meaning
of "persons."'35 In 1978, the Government of India joined with
several other foreign nations to sue Pfizer, Inc. and certain other
pharmaceutical companies under the Clayton Act alleging
damages as purchasers of antibiotics." Again, the court eschewed
a technical or semantic approach when interpreting "persons." In-
stead, the Supreme Court held that a foreign nation could be a
plaintiff within the meaning of "person." Only by giving "person"
an inclusive rather than exclusive meaning could the expansive
remedial and deterrent purposes of the statute be served.
During the same term as Pfizer, the Supreme Court considered
the antitrust liability of municipalities in City of Lafayette, La. v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.1" The Court used this opportunity
to qualify some of the language in Parker. The state action exemp-
" 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
... 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Georgia v. Evans and Parker v. Brown offer good examples of how
the word "persons" can vary in meaning from the context of a person as a plaintiff to the
context of a person as a defendant.
' For a recent application of the state action immunity doctrine, see California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
317 U.S. at 351.
13 Id. at 352.
134 Id.
"u This was indirectly addressed in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
13 Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
137 Id. at 313.
1 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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tion was still applicable to "purely state governmental activities,"
but the court was reluctant to hold that the antitrust laws would
not apply to any state activity.'s' To qualify for immunity under
the Parker doctrine, there must be a "state policy to displace com-
petition with regulation or monopoly public service.""' Moreover,
a state monopoly must refrain from predatory conduct, because
even a lawful monopolist may be subject to antitrust laws when it
attempts to extend or exploit its monopoly in an unauthorized
manner.
1 41
Municipalities, while deriving their existence from the states,
are not equally sovereign. Parker did not hold that all governmen-
tal entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a state,
were, because of their status, exempt from antitrust laws.' To
the extent that they exceed the scope of their properly delegated
powers, municipalities lose their immunity.'
In addressing the issue of whether a municipality was a "per-
son," the court cited Georgia v. Evans and Chattanooga Foundry
& Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta.'" Even though both of these
cases involved government bodies as plaintiffs, "the basis of those
decisions plainly preclude[d] a reading of 'person' or 'persons' to
include [them] as plaintiffs, but not as defendants.""' Because na-
tional policy disfavors immunity, there must be an overriding
public policy to limit the construction of "persons."'"
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the Lafayette opinion. In his
view, the determinative factor was the fact that a city-owned
power company was commercial in nature. Citing Dunhill as
authority, the Chief Justice analogized the "commercial" excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine to the present situation."'7 Because
the city was engaged in "proprietary" activities, it should have
been subject to antitrust laws.
The Chief Justice's "proprietary-governmental" activities
distinction has not been well received.'" According to the dissent,





203 U.S. 390 (1906).
435 U.S. at 397.
', Id. at 398-99.
147 Id. at 424.
The governmental-proprietary distinction has been applied by the courts in numerous
contexts, however. See generally Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary
Distinction in Constitutional Law. 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980). The authors concluded that
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it could only lead to a "quagmire [with] distinctions so finespun
and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind
for adequate formulation."'' 9 Lower courts generally have not ap-
plied this test, although one court attempted to reconcile it with
the plurality by stating that commercial activities often are not
entered into pursuant to state policies.'" The court of appeals, af-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Lafayette, flatly rejected such a
test."5 '
The Lafayette dissent also made several arguments against
subjecting municipal governments to antitrust liability. Unlike big
business, municipalities are controlled politically by the elec-
torate. The only potential areas of liability should be where one
municipality's anticompetitive activity is felt in another munici-
pality. In that situation, political controls would not be as effec-
tive. 152 Another problem with antitrust liability against states is
that treble damages and criminal sanctions may be unconstitu-
tional under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.' 5"
Many courts and commentators have drawn analogies between
the Parker line of cases and act of state cases."' Others have cau-
tioned against drawing such analogies.'55 The reason for caution is
that different considerations underlie the two doctrines. With the
Parker doctrine, the main consideration is federalism, the rela-
the distinction has no fixed content, is not itself indispensable, but that its function in ac-
commodating certain categories of activity within particular legal contexts was necessary.
... 435 U.S. at 433 (Stewart, J., dissenting, quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61, 65-68). The dissent is probably right. This test would be very difficult to apply.
Nevertheless, it is the same test used to determine restrictive sovereign immunity.
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), a similar test for municipal tort
liability was criticized because (1) the states were in conflict as to where to draw the line; (2)
the law within each state was in conflict; and (3) the theory was inherently unsound-all
government activity is governmental, and most government activity has been duplicated by
private individuals.
In Re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
152 This "political control" argument was not accepted in Caribe Trailer Systems v. Puer-
to Rico Maritime, 475 F. Supp. 711 (D.D.C. 1979). In the context of foreign national govern-
ments, the political control argument would cut in favor of subjecting governments to
United States antitrust law since foreign governments are beyond the political control of
the United States electorate.
" 435 U.S. at 443. See also New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th
Cir. 1974). A similar concern is shared by the FSIA, which limits recovery of punitive
damages to suits against instrumentalities or agencies of foreign governments as opposed
to suits against the governments themselves.
'" Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. at 1298 n.18.
115 47 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 987, 989 (1979); see also Griffen, American Antitrust Law and
Foreign Governments, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 137, 140 (1978).
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tionship between the central government and its subordinate
state governments. With the act of state doctrine, the main con-
cern is comity, relations between co-equal and independent
sovereigns. In each case, however, the question is whether Con-
gress intended to include governmental conduct within the pro-
hibitions of the antitrust laws.
Despite dissimilarities, a few comparisons can be made between
the two doctrines. The trend has been for courts to extend an-
titrust liability with respect to state governments before making
a similar extension to foreign governments. This pattern is under-
standable in view of the fact that the national government is in a
stronger position to regulate the affairs of state governments. At
present, no court has held that foreign governments can be con-
sidered "persons" and thus subject to suit under United States an-
titrust laws. The closest that a court has come was in the Out-
board Marine case. It ruled that a communist government's state
trading company could be held liable. An earlier case held that a
government-controlled corporation could be subject to liability."
Although the Outboard Marine court expressly disavowed
deciding whether foreign governments could be sued as "persons"
under the antitrust laws, it was not persuaded that international
comity would prevent a court from treating them as such. The
court stated that "even if Poland were directly involved ... there
can be no genuine insult to sovereignty when a foreign enterprise
undertaking to do business in a given market is subject to non-
discriminatory laws of that marketplace."'57 For the time being,
this may be the extent of the judicial venture, at least until a
parallel movement occurs with respect to state governments. On
the other hand, the recent OPEC decision by a federal district
court constitutes the only ruling that a foreign government was
not a "person" under the antitrust laws. One of the reasons given
was that to hold otherwise "would require judicial interference in
sensitive foreign policy matter."' 51 In addition, the OPEC court
'N United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). The
Supreme Court has cited this case as an example of the difference between liability for
foreign public or semi-public corporations and liability for foreign governments. McGrath v.
Manufacturers Trust Co., 338 U.S. 241 (1949).
This dichotomy between foreign governments and their instrumentalities corresponds
roughly to the liability which City of Lafayette extended to state subdivisions and in-
strumentalities, but not to states qua states.
15, Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. at 398.
' 477 F. Supp. at 572. The court distinguished the Pfizer case in that "[giving a foreign
sovereign the option to sue merely allows the nation to use our judicial system if it wishes.
Allowing foreign sovereigns to be sued, however, would require their presence in our
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noted that liability had not been extended to state governments. '
Certainly, if antitrust liability is ever fully extended to states,
liability of foreign governments probably will not be far behind."s
However, even in the absence of court or congressional repudia-
tion of the Parker doctrine, there are strong policy reasons that
would support antitrust liability of foreign governments. The anti-
trust laws are intended to keep the domestic economy free from
anticompetitive practices. This objective cannot be achieved if the
enforcement mechanisms are hamstrung by outdated immunities.
It is an anomaly that American exporters are given special protec-
tion through the Webb-Pomerane Act against powerful state enter-
prises abroad, while domestic businessmen and consumers are put
in a disadvantage against these very same state enterprises at
home."s' The fundamental issue, of course, is that foreign govern-
ment enterprises are totally beyond the political control of United
States citizens. Those enterprises damage American citizens by
conduct contrary to America's fundamental economic policy. In
most cases, U.S. courts are the only forum for redress. '
IV. CONCLUSION
Within the past few years, the trend has been to reduce the
traditional immunities against antitrust liability. This trend has
been particularly evident in the area of government liability. The
barriers to liability, sovereign immunity and the act of state doc-
trine, have been narrowed by Congress and the courts. Simul-
taneously, coverage under the Sherman and Clayton Acts has ex-
panded. Despite this trend, practical barriers to antitrust liability
remain because the trend appears to be meeting resistance in the
lower courts. Many lower courts simply have been hesitant to apply
the new law. Thus, uncertainty still exists as to the boundaries of the
definition of "commercial activity" under the FSIA. Likewise, the
validity of the "commercial act" exception to the act of state doc-
courts. Thus the latter poses the greater threat to sensitive matters of foreign policy." Id.
at 572 n.18 (emphasis in original). The court also applied the sovereign immunity defense,
notwithstanding the FSIA; thus, since its holding on the two issues stemmed from a com-
mon rationale, its interpretation of congressional intent not to reach foreign governmental
actions with the Sherman Act was infected by sovereign immunity principles.
" 477 F. Supp. at 572.
An interesting caveat was expressed in both the Parker and City of Lafayette cases.
Both chose not to decide whether there could be liability for states when acting in combina-
tion with "others." 317 U.S. at 351-52; 435 U.S. at 441.
,' T. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 77 (1970).
,6, This observation was proffered by Justice Powell, dissenting in Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 330.
1981]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 11:1
trine is in doubt. Finally, the extent of government liability under
Lafayette is not clear. It seems, however, that the "commercial-
governmental" distinction has not been acepted in the context of
state government immunity.
Some of the underlying causes of the uncertainty can be identi-
fied. The "quagmire" of distinguishing governmental from non-
governmental activities definitely muddies the water. The close
mesh of sovereign immunity and act of state, and the relationship
between act of state and state action immunity (Parker doctrine)
also add to the confusion. Finally, that mysterious criterion, comity,
pervades any discussion of foreign governmental liability. Comity,
in reality, is a complicated variety of conflicting political considera-
tions. It is a factor in both the sovereign immunity and act of state
doctrines. Never codified and not recognized in the Constitution,
the elusive concept of comity forces a balancing of the desire for
unfettered commerce among nations with the needs and rights of a
free nation and its citizens to respond to economic warfare."
James F. Ponsoldt*
Jesse Stone
See generally Hill, The Law-making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Pre-
emption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1043 (1967). See also Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 134
(1888). The most appropriate solution for reconciling the interests of comity with national
economic policy would be the establishment of an International Code of Competition. The
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has led continuing ef-
forts to draft a worldwide Restrictive Business Practices Code. Although its provisions
have been directed both at businesses and governments, the principal thrust of this conven-
tion has been. directed at regulating multinational corporations. See Davidow, The
UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code, 13 INT'L LAW. 587, 590 (1980). There has
been disagreement as to the extent that governments should be covered. Developing coun-
tries have argued that their national enterprises should be accorded preferential or dif-
ferential treatment. In contrast, the developed countries have urged that there should be
no such discrimination. Another dispute is whether the convention should exempt restric-
tive business practices "directly caused by sovereign acts of state or authorized by in-
tergovernmental agreements." Id. at 592-93. In any event, it is clear that multinational cor-
porations are not the only entities that can act to restrain competition; "state-owned enter-
prises and international state cartels are equally capable of such practices. A purported
code for competition that neglects such enterprises is wholly inadequate." Gill, The UNC-
TAD Restrictive Business Practices Code: A Code for Competition?, 13 INT'L LAW. 607, 609
(1980). In addition to the disagreement over its scope, a further weakness is its lack of en-
forcement provisions. Implementation is left ultimately to individual countries. Meanwhile,
the United States will have to fashion its own response to the anticompetitive conduct of
foreign governments, and the courts will continue to grapple with the issue of the antitrust
liability of foreign governments.
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